We consider a Diamond-type model of endogenous growth in which there are three assets: outside money, government bonds, and equity. Due to productivity shocks, the equity return is uncertain, and risk averse investors require a positive equity premium. Typically, there exist two steady states, but only one of them is stable, both in the forward perfect foresight dynamics and under adaptive expectations. Tight monetary policy is harmful for growth in the stable steady state. These results hold under four different monetary policy strategies applied by the monetary authority. A monetary contraction increases the bond return, reduces the equity premium and thereby capital investment and growth.
Introduction
This paper deals with the question of how monetary policy a®ects growth. The traditional literature on monetary growth theory emphasizes the Mundell{Tobin or \portfolio" e®ect which says that money growth a®ects the capital stock positively, since higher in°ation reduces the return on real balances which induces investors to reallocate savings from money to capital (see Mundell (1965) , Tobin (1965) ). Within dynamic general equilibrium models, however, such an e®ect is hard to¯nd and most studies report either superneutrality of money or even a negative relation between money growth and real activity. 1 As the theoretical literature, also empirical studies on this issue draw di®erent conclusions.
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Most of the theoretical literature considers only a single outside asset (money) and examines the e®ects of variations of the growth rate of this asset. In such a framework, however, the impact of di®erent monetary strategies on real activity cannot be studied adequately. To address this issue, Smith (1997, 1998 ) consider a Diamond{type overlapping generations model with outside money and government bonds in which di®erent monetary policy strategies like a constant money growth rule, an in°ation targeting or an interest targeting rule can be studied. They show that there exist multiple steady states and that the e®ects of monetary policy on the output level in these steady states are ambiguous.
Schreft and Smith assume that government bonds and physical capital are perfect substitutes in the portfolios of consumers and that¯rms¯nance their capital investments by loans for which they pay the same interest rate as the government on treasury bills. Thus, the rates of return on government bonds and capital coincide, and monetary policy a®ects both interest rates in the same way. For instance, if a higher bond return is induced by a tightening of monetary policy, the capital return and thereby capital investment increase as well. However, this assumption of Diamond{type growth models neglects that¯rms¯nance (part of) their capital investment by equity and that the equity return exceeds the return on government bonds. If there is a positive spread between the equity and the bond return, a higher bond return need not increase the capital return, but may decrease the risk premium, induce investors to buy less equity, and thereby induce¯rms to accumulate less capital. Hence, the traditional Mundell{Tobin 1 e®ect reappears. This paper departs from the model of Schreft and Smith in two important ways. First,¯rms¯nance capital investments by equity instead of bonds and the equity return exceeds the bond return, since there are stochastic productivity shocks and since consumers are risk averse. Second, because of an Arrow{Romer spillover of capital investment on labor productivity, the aggregate technology exhibits increasing returns to scale which gives rise to endogenous growth. This enables us to study the growth e®ects of monetary policy.
Speci¯cally, consumers transfer the labor income of their¯rst lifetime period to the second period by means of three assets: money, government bonds, and equity. Because of a cash{in{advance constraint consumers hold money even if it is return dominated by bonds and equity.
3 Since consumers are risk averse and since the equity return is uncertain, both the equity and the bond demand can be positive when there is a positive (expected) equity premium. Firms¯nance capital investments only by issuing equity. The government consumes a¯xed share of output and¯nances its de¯cit by bonds and by seignorage, whereas the monetary authority controls the money supply by conducting open market operations. Hence, the monetary authority determines the seignorage revenue of the government and can apply di®erent types of monetary strategies. We consider four monetary policy strategies: a constant money growth rule, a stabilization of the ratio of money to bonds, an in°ation targeting and an interest rate targeting rule.
As the model of Schreft and Smith, our model may well have multiple steady states 4 , depending on the parameter speci¯cations and on the monetary strategy. However, only one of these steady states is locally stable, both in the forward perfect foresight dynamics and under adaptive expectations. Moreover, we¯nd that money a®ects growth positively in any stable steady state and for any type of monetary strategy. Only under interest rate targeting the growth e®ect is ambiguous and depends on the size of the risk premium. If the risk premium is too low, an increase in the nominal interest target is accompanied by a larger increase in in°ation which leads to a lower real interest rate and thus to higher growth.
A loose monetary policy raises the seignorage revenue which allows the government to issue less bonds and which reduces thereby the real bond return. Since the expected capital return is constant in our simple AK {type growth model, this raises the equity premium and induces consumers to shift more savings to capital which leads to a higher growth rate. By the same mechanism, an increase of scal expenditures unambiguously reduces the growth rate in any stable steady state, which is in accordance with the¯ndings of Barro (1990) , since government services do not a®ect production or utility in our model. Our argument provides an alternative to related work of van der Ploeg and Alogoskou¯s (1994) who consider the impact of monetary policy in an overlapping generations model in the spirit of Weil (1991) and with endogenous growth due to an Arrow{Romer externality. They¯nd that higher money growth rates a®ect growth positively since currently living generations do not bene¯t from tax cuts in the future, and therefore consume less and invest more which increases the long{run real growth rate. In our model, however, such e®ects of intertemporal taxation are absent, and growth is raised by the monetary policy's impact on asset prices and the equity premium.
Our model also relates to Hahn and Solow (1995, Chapter 2) who consider a Diamond{type growth model in which consumers hold money because of a cash{ in{advance constraint. Unlike Schreft and Smith, Hahn and Solow not only focus on steady states in which money is return dominated by bonds and in which the cash{in{advance constraint on consumers is binding (consumers are liquidity constrained), but they also analyse steady states in which the rate of returns on money and bonds are equal (the nominal interest rate is zero) and in which consumers are portfolio indi®erent. In this paper, we also consider such portfolio{ indi®erence steady states, but we¯nd that their existence depends crucially on the monetary strategy. For instance, under constant money growth or under in°ation targeting, portfolio indi®erence steady states exist only in pathological cases, and under a¯xed money{bond ratio they only exist if the monetary policy is su±ciently loose. When they exist, however, monetary policy has no e®ect on the growth rate in these steady states.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the economic agents and derives the model's equilibrium conditions. Section 3 examines the perfect foresight equilibrium growth paths of the model and discusses the existence, multiplicity and comparative statics of steady states under four di®erent monetary strategies. Section 4 looks at the dynamics with adaptive expectations and shows that the stability features of the forward perfect foresight dynamics are preserved. Section 5 concludes.
The Model
Consider an overlapping generations model in which there are three types of agents: consumers,¯rms and a government. They trade a composite consumption good and labor as well as three types of¯nancial assets: money, bonds and equity. The government issues¯at money and bonds, while¯rms¯nance their capital investments by issuing equity. Since the capital return is uncertain due to stochastic productivity shocks, risk averse consumers require a positive equity premium. Furthermore, because of a liquidity constraint money is held even when it is return dominated by bonds. In detail the agents are described as follows.
The Consumer
There is a single representative consumer who is endowed with one unit of labor in his¯rst period which he supplies inelastically, whereas he consumes in his second period of life only. He aims to transfer his real labor income w t to the second period by holding money (m t ), bonds (b t ) or equity (e t ). The corresponding real gross rates of return are R M t = p t =p t+1 ; R 2 ), where R E t is the mean and ¾ 2 the variance. Moreover, the consumer is risk averse and his von Neumann{Morgenstern utility function is assumed to be u t (c t+1 ) = ¡e ¡½ t c t+1 where ½ t = ½=w t and ½ > 0 is given. This means that the consumer's absolute risk aversion, ½ t , decreases as his income increases and will imply that, on a balanced growth path, he has constant relative risk aversion.
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The consumer's decision problem is max c t+1 ;mt;bt;et 
The following Lemma shows that the equity demand is an increasing function of income and the expected equity premium.
Lemma 1 The consumer's equity demand is
. 5 It may appear a peculiar feature of the utility function that it is decreasing in income w t . Note, however, that w t is not a choice variable for the consumer and, moreover, that this is only a "cardinal" aspect of the utility function in that it could be easily overcome by assuming for example u t (c t+1 ) = ¡½t e ¡½ t ct+1 , with¯su±ciently large, without changing anything in the consumer's preference structure and in the analytical results. The alternative to assume a CRRA utility function c 1¡½ t+1 = (1 ¡ ½) together with a lognormal density for the equity return would not work in the present context since c t+1 is a sum a + bR Proof: The consumer's problem is
r , subject to the constraints in (1). The integral can be written
and, using the formula
Substituting b t = w t ¡ m t ¡ e t , the problem is equivalent to
The solution of this problem leads immediately to (2) and to the claimed equity demand. 2 An alternative formulation of Lemma 2.1 is
whenever e d t > 0: This re°ects the equity premium required due to uncertainty and risk aversion of consumers.
The Firms
Firms are risk{neutral and they produce output Y t from labor input L t and capital input K t using the production technology Y t = © t F (K t ; A t L t ). © t is a total factor productivity shock which is realized only after capital is installed and workers are hired, and all © t are independently and normally distributed with mean 1 and variance ¾ 2 © .
6 F exhibits constant returns to scale and A t measures labor productivity at time t. Firms have to install capital a period in advance by issuing equity. Thus equity supply in period t ¡ 1 is e t¡1 = K t . Since¯rms nance capital input by issuing equity instead of bonds,¯rms maximize pro¯t with respect to labor while capital demand is determined consistently with capital supply of the investors and with the rationality of their expectations (see Hahn and Solow (1995, Chapter 4) ).
Given K t at the beginning of period t, the¯rm's expected pro¯t maximization problem is max
which leads to
where
. To endogenize A t , we assume a positive spillover from aggregate investment on labor productivity, as suggested by Arrow (1962) and Romer (1986) . To be consistent with long{run endogenous growth, we use a linear relationship of the form
where K t is the aggregate capital stock. The size of¯rms is normalized to 1, so K t = K t has to hold in equilibrium, and labor market clearing implies L t = 1. This together with (5) substituted in (4) implies
This in turn implies that the equity return is
Since © t is normally distributed, R E t¡1 is also normally distributed. Rational expectations of investors imply that
Thus, the expected equity return is constant over time and equals the marginal product of capital at the balanced growth level of the capital intensity. This result is due to the constant returns assumption and it implies that if there was no uncertainty and if¯rms could issue bonds instead of equity, the¯rm would choose the same level of capital input at the interest rate R B t = R E t . Therefore bonds and equity would then also be equivalent from the perspective of¯rms.
The Government
The government spends an amount g t of the composite consumption good and nances its de¯cit by issuing bonds and money. We assume that the government's expenditures are a constant share of expected output
e t¡1 where q 2 [0; 1) . The government has to satisfy its budget constraint
The left hand side denotes real government expenditures on consumption and interest payments, and the right hand side contains the newly issued bonds and a seignorage term.
The Equilibrium
By Walras's law, equilibrium on the labor, money, bond, and equity markets imply that also the goods market is in equilibrium, i.e. Y t = c t +g t +e t . Notice that only consumption adjusts to productivity shocks, since government consumption is predetermined and since investment (=equity demand) is a constant fraction of labour income which is not a®ected by productivity shocks (see (6)). Substituting (6) into the consumer's budget constraint yields
Moreover, inserting (6) and (7) into (3) implies
Using (6) again, (2) becomes
Equations (8), (9), (10) and (11) are dynamical equations with endogenous variables m t ; e t ; b t ; R B t and R M t that permit to study the evolution of the system provided the number of state variables is reduced to four. This will be achieved by speci¯cations of monetary policy rules that we study in the sequel.
Monetary Policy
We will consider in this section four di®erent monetary policy rules: a constant money growth policy, a policy in which the central bank stabilizes the ratio of money to government bonds, an interest rate targeting and an in°ation targeting policy.
Constant Money Growth
Adopting a constant money growth rule means M t = ¹M t¡1 for all t, with ¹¸1, where M t is nominal money. Recalling that R M t = p t =p t+1 ; this can equivalently be written
We will¯rst consider the situation in which consumers are liquidity constrained, i.e. in which the nominal interest rate is positive and the liquidity constraint binds. That is, we suppose m t =¸®e t¡1 and R B t > R M t , and we will show that there are in general two or no steady states with this feature. Later on, we consider the case in which the nominal interest rate is zero and in which consumers are portfolio indi®erent, but we will show that there exists generically no such a steady state.
Inserting (10) and (12) into the government's budget constraint (8) and using m t =¸®e t¡1 we obtain
Similarly, (9) becomes
Equations (13) and (14) constitute the dynamical system to be studied, provided R M t < R B t : Since these equations are linearly homogenous, they can be reduced to a one-dimensional equation. Using°t = e t =e t¡1 for the growth rate and x t = b t =w t = b t = (®e t¡1 ) for the share of bonds in income, (14) becomes°t
while (13) can be rewritten as
Substituting (15) into this equation, we obtain a one-dimensional dynamic equation in x t :
The graph of the function Ã is illustrated in Figure 1 .
Notice that e t¸0 requires that x t · 1 ¡¸. Figure 1 also shows two steady states x 1 < x 2 . Because of (15), the associated growth rates are°1 >°2. The steady state with the higher growth rate (with the lower bond share) is asymptotically stable and the other steady state is unstable.
7 Both steady states have 7 Notice that in our model there in no indeterminacy since the initial bond share x 0 does not depend on expectations. This is a consequence of our assumption that neither savings nor the coe±cient of the Clower constraint¸are in°uenced by in°ation expectations. Compare also with Schreft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
For instance, there are two positive steady states if the uncertainty (or risk aversion) and the¯scal share are not too low. A higher level of government spending or a lower money growth rate shift the graph of Ã upwards, increase x 1 and decrease°1. Thus,¯scal policy a®ects growth negatively, but money growth has a positive impact on growth. Because of (10), the bond return increases and the equity premium falls which shifts savings from equity to bonds and reduces growth. A further consequence is that the equity premium and the growth rate are positively related. Notice, however, that the comparative statics e®ects on the other (unstable) steady state are opposite. It remains to check whether the condition R (10) and (12), this condition is satis¯ed in a steady state if
If the government debt is positive in the stable steady state, we have°2 <°1 < (1 ¡¸)®, and therefore (17) holds in both steady states whenever (17) is satis¯ed for°= (1 ¡¸)®. If the production function is Cobb-Douglas, f (a) = ca º , a 9 su±cient condition for (17) to hold in both steady states is that
Necessary for this condition to be ful¯lled is that the term in the brackets is positive which is the case when the money growth rate is larger than (1 ¡¸)(1 ¡ º)=º and which is for sure satis¯ed when º¸1=2. Finally, we consider the situation of a zero nominal interest rate in which consumers are indi®erent between holding money and bonds. Unlike the model of Hahn and Solow (1995, Chapter 2), our economy has generically no steady state with that feature. To see this, notice that in this case the dynamical system is described by (9) , by
and, using (8) and (18), by
Again, these three equations are homogenous of degree one in (b; m; e) and they can be reduced to two equations using the variables°t = e t =e t¡1 ,¯t = b t =e t and
(19) becomes°t
and (9) is
(20) de¯nes a unique stationary growth rate by°=
(21) implies that a steady state has to ful¯ll
But this latter condition is in general not compatible with (22) since this would require that
which can only hold true for very particular parameter constallations (for instance if q = 0 and ¹ = 1 as in the model of Hahn and Solow (1995), but not under more general policy speci¯cations).
The results of this section are summarized as follows.
Proposition 2 Under constant money growth, there are no or two steady states in which consumers are liquidity constrained. The steady state with the higher growth rate is asymptotically stable, and the other steady state is unstable. The growth rate and the equity premium at the stable steady state are higher if money growth is faster or if the¯scal share is lower. An equilibrium with portfolio indi®erence generally does not exist.
Fixed Money{bond Ratio
We assume here along the lines of Schreft and Smith (1998) that the monetary authority stabilizes the money supply relative to the level of public debt in the economy. That is, it¯xes the ratio of bonds to money, b t =m t = · for all t: Higher levels of · represent an increase in the bond{money ratio and correspond to a tighter monetary regime. Starting with the case R B t > R M t , m t =¸®e t¡1 and (9) yield e t = (1 ¡ (1 + ·)¸) ®e t¡1 :
which means that the growth rate is constant and independent of q and ½¾ 2 : Since the central bank¯xes the mix of government liabilities (bonds and outside money) over time,¯scal policy has no e®ect on growth. Furthermore it follows that x t = ·¸= x and thus also x t is constant and independent of q and ½¾ 2 : By (10) the steadystate bond return is
These results imply that a tighter monetary policy (an increase in ·) increases bond supply and the bond return, reduces the equity premium, increases the ration of bonds to capital, and decreases the growth rate. From (8), (10) and m t =¸®e t¡1
which in equilibrium becomes
This enables us now to check the validity of the assumption that R M < R B : Using (23), (24) and (25) we can restate this condition as µ (1 + ·)
For given values of the other parameters, this condition can always be ful¯lled by assuming · and/or q big enough. Moreover, in the special case ½¾ 2 = q = 0 and f (a) = ca º it becomes
which is for sure satis¯ed when º¸1=2:
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To complete the analysis we also consider the case of portfolio indi®erence, i.e. R whereas (8) and (10) 
Setting as before°t = e t =e t¡1 and º t = m t =e t these equations can be written as
Solving for°t = ® 1 + Â t with Â t = (1 + ·) º t from the¯rst equation and inserting in the second yields
8 When ½¾ 2 = 0, the consumer is risk neutral or there is no uncertainty. This can be considered a limiting case of our setting in which, from (7) and (10) Finally solving for Â t we obtain
To explore the existence of steady states let us start with the case ½¾ 2 = q = 0: Then Â = 0 is one steady state and, since Á (Â) ! 1 as Â ! ®=f 0 (a), an additional positive (unstable) steady state exists if Á 0 (0) < 1. In the special case f (a) = ca º this means º < 1=2. Then, as q is slightly increased, Á (0) > 0 and a stable positive steady state Â emerges. This remains true when ½¾ 2 is slightly increased, too. However, this steady state is only an equilibrium of our model if also the liquidity constraint m t¸¸® e t¡1 is satis¯ed. This constraint means that
, which can be satis¯ed, if at all, only when · is small enough. That is, only a su±ciently loose monetary policy may give rise to a steady state in which the nominal interest rate is zero and in which consumers are portfolio indi®erent. In any way, whenever such a steady state exists, it is clear that a variation in · does not change Â and therefore does not change°either. In conclusion we thus have:
Proposition 3 Under a¯xed bond{money ratio b t =m t = ·; there is at most one equilibrium in which consumers are liquidity constrained and which must be a steady state. In such an equilibrium a tightening of the monetary regime (i.e. a higher ·) decreases the growth rate, while¯scal policy does not a®ect growth. If the monetary regime is su±ciently loose, steady states in which consumers are portfolio indi®erent may also exist, but in these steady states the growth rate is independent of ·:
Interest Rate Targeting
In this case the central bank intends to¯x the nominal interest factor I t at a value I > 1 for all t. Since I = R B t =R M t , consumers are liquidity constrained, m t =¸®e t¡1 . Equation (8) 
Setting again x t = b t = (®e t¡1 ), dividing by e t¡1 and using (15) yields
Solving for x t we obtain
The graph of this function is qualitatively the same as the one shown in Figure  1 . Both steady states have a positive level of government debt if
hold. This is for example true when the uncertainty/risk aversion and the¯s-cal share are high enough. Moreover, higher uncertainty or risk aversion and a lower level of government spending shift the curve downwards decreasing x 1 and increasing°1. Regarding the e®ect of a change in the nominal interest rate, it can be obtained from
For small uncertainty/risk aversion this derivative is negative implying that an increase in I decreases x 1 and increases°1 whereas for large ½¾ 2 the e®ect is reversed. If the uncertainty and risk aversion are low, the increase in the nominal interest rate is accompanied by a larger increase in the in°ation rate which lowers the real interest rate and raises capital investment. On the other hand, if uncertainty and risk aversion are large, the in°ation rate increases less than the nominal interest rate, and so the real interest rate increases as well which a®ects growth negatively. We have therefore obtained the following result.
Again using x t for the bond share, substituting (15) for the growth rate, and substituting I t¡1 in (29) by (30), (28) and (29) yield
It is immediate from these de¯nitions that the functions ª and g satisfy
10 ª i denotes the ith partial derivative of ª. The¯rst inequality follows since
Notice that the assumption of perfect foresight, R M;e t¡1 = R M t¡1 = g(x t¡1 ), yields the perfect foresight dynamics
as derived in Section 3.1. Assuming adaptive expectations, the actual dynamics is described by
with some adjustment parameter´2 [0; 1). The stability features of the forward perfect foresight dynamics turn out to be equivalent to those under adaptive expectations, provided that (31) holds. As a consequence of this result, the high growth steady state x 1 of Section 3.1 is also stable under adaptive expectations and the low growth steady state x 2 is unstable under adaptive expectations.
Proposition 6
Suppose that (31) holds and that x is a steady state with jÃ 0 (x)j 6 = 1. Then x is locally stable under (32) if and only if (x; g(x)) is locally stable under (33).
Proof: Suppose¯rst that x is locally stable under (32). Therefore
holds at x: Let J denote the Jacobian of (33) evaluated at (x; g(x)). Then det J = (ª 1 +ª 2 g 0 )¡ª 2 g 0 and Tr J = ª 1 +´. The steady state (x; g(x)) is locally stable under (33) if the conditions det J < 1, det J > Tr J ¡ 1 and det J > ¡ Tr J ¡ 1 are satis¯ed. The¯rst of these conditions means that (ª 1 + ª 2 g 0 ) < 1 + ª 2 g 0 which is clearly ful¯lled because of (34) and ª 2 g 0 > 0. The second condition is equivalent to (34) and is thus satis¯ed. The third condition is ful¯lled if (1 +´) (1 + ª 1 ) > (1 ¡´) ª 2 g 0 and is satis¯ed since ª 1 > 0 and ª 2 g 0 < ª 1 + ª 2 g 0 < 1. Hence (x; g(x)) is locally stable under (33).
Suppose conversely that (x; g(x)) is locally stable under (33) and that x is unstable under (32). Thus, ª 1 + ª 2 g 0 > 1; which implies that det J < Tr J ¡ 1: But this implies that one eigenvalue of J has modulus greater than one, a contradiction. 2
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Conclusions
We have considered an economy where consumers hold two outside assets (money and government bonds) and capital, and where the central bank can apply di®er-ent monetary strategies to promote growth. Multiple steady states with positive nominal interest rates exist, whereas portfolio indi®erence steady states in which the nominal interest rate is zero exist only in pathological situations. This result contrasts with the analysis of Hahn and Solow (1995, Chapter 2) who focus on portfolio indi®erence steady states and who argue that they give rise to instability and endogenous°uctuations. However, even though there are multiple steady states, only one of them is stable, not only in the dynamics with perfect foresight but also in the dynamics with adaptive expectations. An expansive monetary policy enhances growth in the unique stable steady state, and this result is irrespective of the monetary strategy. Only under an interest rate targeting policy, the outcome depends crucially on the policy's e®ect on the real interest rate. Typically, however, an expansive monetary policy lowers the real interest rate, raises the risk premium and promotes capital accumulation.
To keep our model analytically tractable, we have imposed some simplifying assumptions whose relaxation would be worthful to investigate. We assumed that consumers consume only in old age and save all their labor income. A more general savings behaviour would allow to study the interaction between portfolio choice and savings, and this interaction can be expected to be relevant also for the policy conclusions. Another simpli¯cation is the assumption of an Arrow{ Romer externality leading to endogenous growth, and it would be interesting to examine other endogenous growth models in which growth is generated from human capital formation or from innovations.
